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IS TRIAL BY JURY: AN INEFFECTIVE
SURVIVAL?
A. C. UMBRETT, A.M., LL.B.*
In the January issue of the American Bar Association Journall
appears an article written by a member of the California Bar
severely arraigning the modern procedure of trial by jury. The
indictment consists of six counts or specifications. The gravamen
of the charge that trial by jury is an ineffective survival, is quite
clearly set out in the opening paragraph of the article. It is there
said:
"Those who have had occasion to observe the methods employed
in the administration of judicial principles, have necessarily been
confronted with a realization of the inadequacy and inefficiency
of the judicial trial by jury. Its defects are so patent as to
compel the attention of even the casual observer, and to one
compelled to cope with it as an essential factor in his personal
concerns, it assumes the characteristics of the fabled dragons
of mythology, frustrating the objects of commendable endeavor
and reducing to wretchedness the victims it cannot destroy. The
jury, established in answer to the peculiar needs of the age that
produced it, exists to-day without a vestige of reason, the altered
conditions occasioned by man's progress having made it ineffectual
and inexpedient as an agency of legal administration."
The writer of the article in question, apparently realizing that
a mere condemnation of modern trial by jury and an advocacy
of its abolition, would only amount to mental exercise, suggests
a substitute for the procedure he condemns. To test the
sufficiency of the indictment it will be profitable to consider,
briefly, the substitute offered for the procedure condemned.
The substitute suggested is the establishment of a state judiciary
composed of three separate divisions, and there should be as
many courts of the first division established in each county of
*Professor of Law, Marquette University School of Law. 1A. Bar Ass.
Journal Vol. X No. I, page 53.
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the state as necessity would dictate. This first division is to
consist of three members elected for a term of eight years by the
voters of the county or district in which they are to officiate and
this division is to constitute the original trial courts for all legal
controversies, irrespective of their character or the nature of the
matters involved. In other words, this first division court is to
take the place of the Circuit Courts now established in this state.
The three judges of this first division are to sit in bank in the
trial of those cases in which now a trial by jury is granted as a
privilege or as a matter of right to either party and by a con-
currence of two of their members, decisions on both facts and
law involved in these cases are to be rendered. Where under the
present procedure a trial by jury is not provided, or where neither
party to a controversy desires a trial by the court sitting in bank,
one member of the tribunal is to hear and determine controversies.
An appellate tribunal to hear appeals from the decisions of
these trial courts is also provided, consisting of five members
elected for a term of sixteen years by the vote of the people of
the state. The number of these appellate courts will depend
upon the necessity for such courts in the different states. There
is also created a last and final court of the state, composed of
seven members elected to office for life by the voters of the state.
to which appeals could be taken from the decisions of the appellate
courts.
This is the outline of the new judicial procedure proposed as a
substitute for our present procedure of trial by jury. It will be
noted, in passing, that while under our present system of the
trial of facts by a jury the concurrence of twelve minds, or at
least of ten, is necessary to establish a fact judicially; under the
proposed system the final determination of a fact judicially may
be had by the concurrence of but nine minds assuming that a
fact is so established by a majority vote in each of the three
divisions. If there is any safety in numbers, this safety is
effectually eliminated by this proposed substitution.
The various counts of the indictment under discussion will now
be briefly considered.
Count One: It is charged that tTial by jury is old, antiquated,
and was the outgrowth of a peculiar social and economic system
for the protection of the common people, but that in modern
times such protection is no longer needed and the institution
itself is unsuited to present day conditions. It is asserted that
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trial by jury was first promised and guaranteed by the provisions
of Magna Carta and that the conditions existing in 1215 when
the signature to this instrument was forced from King John by
the Barons of the Realm, were so peculiar that the liberty of the
common people depended upon having their rights as between
man and man determined by their peers, but that the conditions
now have so vitally changed from the conditions then, that there
is at present no excuse for the survival of this method of
determining facts in litigation.
It is trae that trial by jury is old, in fact, the principle is much
older than the date given by the writer of the article in question.
Again, Magna Carta not only did not create the institution of
trial by jury, but did not even guarantee it. Thus it has been
said:
"One persistent error, universally adopted for many centuries,
and even now hard to dispel, is that the Great Charter granted or
guaranteed trial by jury. This belief, however, which has endured
so long and played so prominent a part in political theory is now
held by all competent authorities to be entirely unfounded."'
This historian in concluding his discussion of trial by jury as
referred to in Magna Carta says:
"Magna Carta does not promise 'trial by jury' to anyone."
Other historians who have examined the origin of trial by jury
have reached the same conclusion. 2 Trial by jury is older than
Magna Carta.
The historian Hume credits Alfred the Great, (871-9ot) as
the originator of trial by jury in England. Thus in discussing
the procedure adopted by Alfred in determining controversies
between members of different decennaries, the historian says:
"Their method of decision deserves to be noted as being the
origin of juries; an institution admirable in itself, and the best
calculated for the preservation of liberty and the administration
of justice that ever was devised by the wit of man. Twelve
freeholders were chosen, who, having sworn, together with the
hundreder, or presiding magistrate of that division, to administer
impartial justice, proceeded to the examination of that cause
which was submitted to their jurisdiction."
Trial by jury is older than the reign of Alfred the Great. The
'McKechnie, Magna Carta, page 158.
II Reeves, History of English Law, page 42.
Forsyth's History, Trial by Jury, page 91.
Pollock & Maitland, History of English Law, page i5z.
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institution was known in the time of the Roman Republic; thus
under the Plantian law proposed and adopted 89 B. C. the jury
was made a popular institution and all classes were admitted to
the jury box, three qualifications being required: first, proper
age; second, honorable character; third, no other office in the
public service. Hence, all Roman citizens were eligible to jury
service.
But trial by jury was known even under the Mosaic Jaw. Thus
it was provided under that ancient law that in cases where a
person bad inadvertently or accidentally killed another and had
successfully escaped into one of the Cities of Refuge, the question
whether the homicide was accidental or otherwise, was not to be
determined by judges or priests, but by the "Congregation," that
is, by a jury.
The purpose of these historical references is not so much to
correct the author of the article in question or to give a chronology
of the origin and development of trial by jury, as it is to
emphasize the fact that an institution which has survived varying
experiences for centuries, under varying conditions, and among
totally dissimilar peoples and civilizations, must have something
innately vital and must have filled a human want during all these
centuries and under all conditions of civilization. When it is
remembered that trial by jury in every, instance where it was
inaugurated in the various civilized countries, ancient and modern,
succeeded trials by judges alone, a reason for this vitality is
readily suggested. Hence, the age of the judicial system under
discussion, its survival under all kinds and forms of civilization,
its meeting the needs of peoples and nations widely different in
their tastes, their aspirations and their governmental systems,
instead of being a cause for condign condemnation, is rather a
badge of its excellency and fitness for even modem conditions.
Co.unt Two: It is next charged that trial by jury has ceased
properly to function as a judicial institution because of the
mimicry indulged in "with pathetic earnestness" of selecting
members of modern juries from political subdivisions, the
inhabitants of which know nothing of the facts involved in the
litigation for the determining of which they are selected, and
resulting in a situation described as-
"Abysmal ignorance constitutes a condition precedent in the
qualification of jurors, and that ignorance must be established
to the satisfaction of contending counsel, else the prospective
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juror is summarily dismissed from the body to which he would,
if permitted. have brought enlightenment."
It is possible that there are some benighted communities where
the result just depicted by this charge is occasionally produced.
If so, such is not the case in this state where jurors are selected
by a judicially appointed commission from the electors at large,
who represent the average intelligence and integrity of the com-
munity. In Wisconsin, women now have full civil rights and are
eligible for jury duty, and hardly a jury is now selected here in
which there are not a number of women. Hence, here, at least,
"abysmal ignorance" is not only not the rule, but not even the
exception. If communities can be found where jurors are justly
subject to the criticism contained in this count, then such com-
munities receive just the kind of justice they deserve.
Furthermore, this charge challenges the efficiency of the method
of selecting the jurors and in no way affects the value of the
institution of trial by jury itself. The supposed ignorance of
jurors selected to determine facts in a given litigation which, it is
claimed, will control their judgment in such determination, would
likewise control their judgment in selecting and voting for the
three judges of a given division who are to constitute the original
trial courts and determine all facts in all litigations arising in the
pertinent political division. If the assumed ignorance of jurors
in a given case vitiates the due administration of justice in such
case, then the same vice would operate when the same ignorant
jurors select the trier of facts in all cases.
Count Three: It is next charged that in addition to the
ignorance of the members constituting the modern jury, the
jurors are asked to determine the issues of an instant case upon
a distorted presentation of the facts because of the astuteness of
respective counsel in carefully concealing the evidence of material
facts that would adversely effect their clients, and that such deceit
is possible because of the artful practices peculiar to the court
room. This charge, instead of being a serious one against the
modern jury and its members, is a most serious arraignment of
the legal profession, as well as a serious reflection upon the courts.
If such sharp practices are permitted by the presiding judge in the
trial of a case, then such judge is either incompetent, ignorant,
or worse, and if a miscarriage of justice results from such
practices, it cannot properly be charged against the jury or
against the institution of trial by jury. If this practice has
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become so universal as to call for the abolition of trial by jury,
then it must follow that a majority of the members of the bar are
skilled in and practice this "astuteness" which results in a dis-
torted presentation of facts elicited from "carefully coached and
instructed witnesses." If the majority of practicing attorneys are
thus corrupt, then the proposed substitute for trial by jury will
call for the selection and election of three judges as triers of all
facts from this tainted contingent of the community. Shades of
Bacon, note the advance made in judicial procedure under modern
civilization !
Count Four: The next charge is that trial by jury is a failure
because jurors are human, are subjected to human frailties and
delinquencies and possess human passions and desires so that they
leave the province of disinterested triers oE fact and indulge in
prejudice, bias and all uncharitableness. This accusation is sought
to be sustained by the assertion that the three judges who are to
take the place of jurors are not subjected to human frailties,
delinquencies and passions, but have, by sustained and arduous
discipline, overcome these human attributes and become unsympa-
thetic arbiters of facts, cold-blooded logicians and, in a law suit,
will "hew close to the line, let the chips fall where they may."
Unfortunately, experience does not sustain this proposition. It
may seem a paradox, but it is, nevertheless, true that the habitual
and constant exercise of balancing disputed facts to discover
where the truth lies, unfits a man to determine the truth. Every
person, even though he be a judge, has a modc of drawing
inferences from certain facts proved, peculiar to himself, has
certain theories with respect to the motives that influence conduct,
has a strong disposition to adopt and resort to some general rule
by which all questions of doubt and difficulty are to be measured
and determined. It is certainly extremely unsafe in determining
the motives of human conduct which play so large a part in
cases of disputed and contested facts, to generalize and to assume
that men will act according to a theory of conduct which a judge,
or three judges, may have adopted as a guiding rule. Very many,
if not the most, of the cases which reach courts for determination,
arise out of commercial and industrial transactions, and it is safe
to affirm that the persons most likely to understand the nature
of these transactions and arrive at the truth of the dispute between
litigant parties are those who are conversant with the details of
business and engaged in similar occupations themselves. It is
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such men who constitute our juries, who enter the jury box in a
given case without any preconceived ideas of how the facts are to
be tested and the probative value of circumstances proven to be
measured in determining the rights of the parties before the court
and the jury. It is a matter of almost common knowledge in the
profession that many of our judges, while learned in the law and
safe determiners of the law in cases tried before them are rather
unsatisfactory triers of fact, and the longer they remain upon
the bench the more unsatisfactory their decisions of fact fre-
quently become, because of their withdrawal from the active
business and industrial affairs of the community and a consequent
want of familiarity with the practical affairs of life.
Count Four: The next charge is that trial by jury is a failure
the jury system in that it alleges that the average citizen, and our
juries are composed of average citizens, is a man of small means
and if at all susceptible of corruption, makes him an easy prey
to be influenced in reaching his verdict by financial considerations
either directly offered by one of the parties to the litigation, or
indirectly offered by the hope or the suggestion of financial
advantage in the future after the verdict has been reached. That
verdicts of juries have been bought may be admitted, but such
crass corruption of our judicial procedure is very rare. If history
is to be believed, judges have not been free from being so
influenced, but, as already suggested, the instances of verdicts
from juries, and decisions and judgments from courts, obtained
by bribery are so infrequent, that these few cases cannot be
considered as a condemnation of either judges or juries.
Count Six: The last specific charge lodged against the
institution of trial by jury is that verdicts of juries are frequently
based upon the popular opinion of the community at the time,
rather than upon the evidence submitted in Court; in other words,
that juries are guided by their decisions as to the facts of a case
by what they believe would be the opinion of the majority of the
people, were the question submitted to them. That juries some-
times decide cases not upon the facts presented to them but upon
what they believe would reflect the popular side of the litigation
is true, but it can be asserted with confidence that judges are not
always entirely free from the influence of popular opinion in
deciding cases before them. The instances where the "ear to the
ground" is decisive in determining the facts in a litigated case,
rather than conscience and judgment, are generally criminal cases
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brought under an unpopular law, a law tha, the majority of a
community does not endorse. Where such a miscarriage of
abstract justice occurs, the community, as stated before in another
connection, receives just such an administration of justice as it
deserves.
Perverse verdicts have been rendered by juries, but the damage
done to the administration of justice by such verdicts, has been
greatly minimized, if not entirely neutralized, by the power of
the court to set aside such verdicts and grant new trials. k
striking example of the use of such power on the part of the
Court was the recent case of Jackson v. The American League
Baseball Club, et al., tried in the Circuit Court of Milwaukee
County within the month. The jury in this case returned a large
verdict in favor of the plaintiff and the trial court reprimanded
the jury for the verdict, set it aside, and dismissed the action on
the ground that the trial of the case "reeked with perjury."
During the trial of the case, one of the witnesses for the plaintiff
was ordered arrested by the court for perjury, and after the case
had been submitted to the jury the plaintiff himself was arrested
for perjury upon the order of the court.
Trial by jury is not to be consigned into oblivion because here
and there an individual jury will fail to do its duty, will cause
an apparent miscarriage of justice, render a perverse verdict, be
misled by the "adroit manipulation and the flagrant disregard of
principles" on the part of astute and conscienceless attorneys in
the trial of cases.
So far I have considered trial by jury merely as a judicial
institution, as an arm of the court in the administration of justice,
but trial by jury plays a large part in the social and political life
of a community. Serving upon a jury brings the individual not
only in close contact with the law as administered by our courts,
but brings him in closer contact with his fellow citizens, gives him
a very active share in the administration of public affairs and
offers him an opportunity to make his voice heard and his
influence felt in questions of local interest. Want of respect for
the law has been repeatedly urged as one of the dangers threaten-
ing our Republic. While quite a respectable number of the
people of a community are called to serve as jurors and thus
brought into direct and close connection with the law itself and
given a share in its administration, respect for the law will be
created in the minds of those in whom it did not exist, and will
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be strengthened in the minds of others who had it, but in whom
such respect may have lain dormant.
Trial by jury also tends to foster respect for our courts, the
last and final protecting tribunal of our liberties. Abolish this
institution and you have taken away practically the last oppor-
tunity the great mass of the people have of participating in any
way in any of the activities of Government, of being in any way
concerned in the political life of the community and have left
them only the right of exercising the elective franchise, a privilege
which all too many of our citizens at present do not appreciate.
Trial by jury is too deeply rooted in our civilization, is too
important to our judicial system, is of too great value to our
social and political life to be rudely condemned and uncere-
moniously abolished at the request and behest of disappointed
litigants and their attorneys, and to be replaced by an experiment
in judicial procedure which history has shown to be a failure
whenever tried and to replace which trial by jury was instituted.
At any rate, it is the part of wisdom to follow the conclusion
of Hamlet when he said:
"rather bear those ills we have,
Than fly to others that we know not of."
The indictment should be quashed.
